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ESTATlil OJ' NEWTON

[L. A. No. 20827.

[35C.2d

In Bank. Sept. 7, 1950.]

Estate of ARTHUR B. NEWTON, Deceased. THOMAS H.
KUCHEL, as State Controller, etc., Appellant, v. BEVERLY M. NEWTON, Respondent.
[1) Wills-Powers of Appointment.-A power of appointment was
exercised in this state in which the donee died a resident,
rather than in the state in which he made the will and appointment therein, since a will takes effect at death.
[SI) Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Power of Appointment.The exercise of a power of appointment over out-of-state
personal property in the will of the donee who dit'-d a resident of this state was taxable under section 2 (6) of the
Inheritance Tax Act of 1935 as amended in 1941 (Stats. 1941,
p. 1222; now embodied in Rev. &; Tax. Code, §§ 13692, 13693),
where the donor died before th .. effective date of the act, and
the power was exercised thereafter. (Overruling conflicting
declarations in Estate of Bowditch (1922), 189 Cal. 377, 208
P.282.)

)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County sustaining objections to report of inheritance
tax appraiser. Harold B. Jeffery, Judge. Reversed.
James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Attorney, Morton
L. Barker, Senior Inheritance Tax Attorney, and Vincent J.
McMahon, Assistant Inheritance Tax Attorney, for Appellant.
Leon W. Delbridge, Brady & Nossaman and Walter L.
Nossaman for Respondent.
McCutchen, Thomas'IMatthew, Griffiths & Greene as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
SHENK, J .-The State Controller has appealed from an
order sustaining objections to the report of the inheritance tax
appraiser and fixing inheritance tax in the sum of $14.08,
which was less by $31,105.19 than the amount fixed in the
report.
The facts are not in dispute. A testamentary trust was
[2] Inheritance tax on property under power of appointment,
Dotes, 141 A.L.R. 954; 150 A.L.R. 73. See, also 24 Cal.Jur. 445;
28 Am.Jur. 68, 78.
licK. Dii. References: [1] Wills, § 324; [2] Taxation, 1426.
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created in the State of New York by Charles E. Newton. the
decedent's father, who died a resident of that state on October
19, 1921. The trust provided for an income to the decedent
during his life. Further provisions gave him the power by
will to appoint his wife to take on his death a specified proportion of the trust assets. The decedent executed a will in New
York on May 2d, 1930, whereby he appointed his wife as the
beneficiary. Later he and his wife removed to California where
as a resident he died on March 11, 1943, leaving his widow, the
respondent herein. His will was admitted to probate.
The assets of the trust subject to the appointment consist
entirely of intangibles valued at $412,510.36 held in trust by
New York trustees. There are no shares of California corporations. The widow objected to the Controller's report on the
ground that under the decision in Estate of Bowditch, 189
Cal. 377 [208 P. 282, 23 A.L.R. 735], the state was without
jurisdiction to impose the portion of the tax measured by the
appraised value of the intangibles held in New York.
[1] There is no merit in the contention that the exercise
of the power of appointment occurred at the time the decedent
made his will in New York. Since a will takes effect as of the
time of the death of the testator there can be no question that
the death of the decedent determined the time of the exercise
of the power. (Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 329 [41 P. 1089,
50' Am.St.Rep. 43].)
[2] Prior to 1922 the history regarding the taxation in
this state of transfers of property through the gift or exercise
of powers of appointment was substantially the following:
The Inheritance Tax Act of 1905 (Stats. 1905, p. 341, § 1),
made taxable the exercise of powers of appointment as a
transfer of property by will from the donee of the power.
(Provisions regarding nonc:sercise of the power· will not be
. ,,_._.. ;no:ted.LT.he Inheritance Tax Act of 1913 (Stats. 1913, p.
1066) repealed that provision with a saving clause, and in
section 3 provided that the gift of a power of appointment
'Was a taxable transfer of property from the donor to the
donee upon the death of the donor. In 1917 (Stats. 1917, p.
880) the 1913 enactment was repealed with a saving clause
and the Legislature reverted to the 1905 provision, again
making taxable the transfer by the exercise of the power
(§ 2(6», and it remained so until 1935. In the 1917 act
(§ 1(2» the words "estate" and "property" included aU
personal property of resident decedents within or without
,~ state.

)

)
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In August 1922 this court decided Estate 01 Bowditch,
BUpra (189 CaL 377). The resident decedent, Charlotte Bow-

...

__ ..._----_.....

)

"

....

_

.....•

_._-

ditch, was the donee of a power to appoint and did appoint by
will the beneficiary of a trust created under the will of her
father, a Massachusetts domiciliary. The trust assets amounting in value to. some $299,000 consisted entirely of personal
property, the nature of which was not disclosed in the opinion,
located in Massachusetts. The facts were in essence parallel
to those of the present ease and the appeal brought to this
court the question whether the state had jurisdiction to include
the transfer by the decedent's exercise of the power of appointment as a taxable transfer. The court recognized that a
succession to property effected independently of the. authority
of a particular state was not taxable by that state and was
not within the purview of its inheritance tax acts. In applying
the test it was observed that the state had plenary' power over
the administration and disposition of estates of persons domiciled here including personal property wherever situated. and
that jurisdiction to exercise the taxing power attached when
there was actual or constructive situs of the property within
the state. The court concluded, however, that under the facts
the state could not tax the transfer effected through the exercise of the power by the decedent. The court relied on United
States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 [41 8. Ct. 256, 65 L.Ed. 617],
Walker v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 221 Mass. 600 [109
N.E. 647], and Shattuck v. B1trrage, 229 Mass. 448 [118 N.E.
889], in making the following statement ~ "But personal
property which is the subjeet of a power of appointment does
not acquire a iConstructive situs in the state of the domicile of
the donee of the said power under this theory lie. that personal estate wherever situated is deemed to have the situs of
the domicile of the owner], for such property is no part of
the estate of the donee. 'When a donor gives to another power
of appointment over property. the donee of the power does
not. thereby become the owner of the property. The donee h."lS
no title wh3tever to the property. The power is simply"
delegation to the donee of authority to nct for the donor in
the disposition of the latter's property' . . . Therefore, for
the purpose of testamentary succession and distribution, the
property here involved has acquired no situs in t.his state,
either aetual or constructive, and the laws of f\la.'!Sachusctts
alone control the transfer thereof under the will of Charlott.e
Bowditeh. " Thus the theory was that since the intere::;t of
the transferee was derived from the will of the .M.assaehu&eta
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donor, there was no resort to the sovereignty of this state for
the transfer of the property interest through the decedent'.
exercise of the power of appointment. (See Estate of Dillingham, 196 Cal. 525, 533-534 [238 P. 367].)
In 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 693, § 1 (2» the following italicized
words were added in the definition of "estate" and "property" to include "all personal property within or without
the state or subject to the jurisdiction thereof."
Between that year and the next statutory change the United
States Supreme Court decided W aehovia Bank d'; Trust Co.
v. Doughton (1926),272 U.S. 567 [47 S.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413].
The facts were somewhat similar to those in the Bowditch
probated
case. The donor died in Massachusetts leaving a
there. A trust created thereby, located and administered in
Massachusetts, gave to the donor's daughter the power to
appoint the beneficiary of trust assets consisting of intangibles
valued at nearly $400,000. The donee appointed beneficiaries
by will and died a resident of North Carolina. The question
of the jurisdiction of North Carolina to tax the exercise of
the power under a statute designating the exercise thereof as
a transfer taxable in the same manner as though the property
belonged absolutely to the donee was presented to the Supreme
Court. The court noted the principles of the cases above
cited, among others, as those commonly accepted as controlling
the question of the constructive situs of the intangibles in
the taxing state and concluded that no right exercised by the
donee was conferred by North Carolina; therefore that North
Carolina did not have jurisdiction to impose the tax. Mr.
Justice Holmes stated his disRenting view that the result was
irreconcilable with Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 [36
8.0t. 473,£0 L:Ed.-8301,where thegenernJ power was considered to have thc skme effect as ownership.
In 1935 (Stats. 1935, p. 1266) the Legislature amended
section 2 (6) to make the gift of the power a taxable transfer
as in the 1913 statute. As amended the section read: "Whenever any person or corporation shall be given a power of
appointment by virtue of any disposition of property made
before or after the passage of this act, such gift of power of
appointment shall, under the provisions of this act, be deemed
a taxable transfer made from the donor of said power to the
donee thereof at the date of the donor's death; provided that
where the donor of a power of appointment dies prior to the

will

)

•
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taking effect of this amendment and the power is exercised
thereafter the exercise of said power of appointment shall be
deemed a transfer taxable as provided in subdivision 6 of
section 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act of 1921 as amended in
1929." At the same time the definition of "estate" and
"property" (§ 1(2» was amended to include "all intangible
personal property of resident decedents wii.hin or without the
State or subject to the jurisdiction thereof."
The foregoing provisions of section 2 (6), with the addition
of the words" general or limited" preceding the words" power
of appointment," were in effect retained by the amendment
of 1941 (Stats. 1941, p. 1222, now embodied in Rev. & Tax.
Code, §§ 13692 and 13693). The 1935 act as amended in 1941
was the statute in force at the time of the decedent's death
in 1943. The result was to impose the tax on a transfer by
the gift of the power of appointment made by a resident donor,
except that the imposition of the tax on a transfer through
the exercise of the power by a resident donee was saved where
the donor had died prior to the effective date of the 1935
amendment. The death of the donor, decedent's father, prior
to the effective date of the 1935 statute calls for the application of the saving clause to the decedent's exercise of the
power. There is no question of the correctness of the inheritance tax appraiser's computation of the tax if the statute
applies to impose it.
In 1938 the Supreme Court decided Curry v. McCanless,
307 U.S. 357 [59 8.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162],
and Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 [59 S.Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed.
1356]. In the McCanless case the question was whether
Tennessee as well as Alabama might constitutionally impose
death taxes uponl the transfer of an interest in intangibles
held in trust in Alabama but passing by testamentary appointment under a donated power exercised by a decedent domiciled
in Tennessee. The decedent was both the donor and the donee
of the power. By statute Tennessee iInposed a tax on transfers
of resident decedents' intangible property wherever located including transfers under powers of appointment. The Supreme
Court noted the nature of intangibles, the practical difficulties
in applying to them a physical situs, and the sovereign power
which extends over intangibles of a domiciled decedent although they have no physical location within the state exercising the power. It was declared that a jurisdiction which does
not depend on physical presence within the state is not lost
by declaring that it is absent. It was held that the power to
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tax the intangibles was not lost because the court might choose
to say that they were located elsewhere; that the decedent's
power to dispose of intangibles was a potential source of
wealth and therefore property in his hands; and that there
was no substantial difference between that and any other case
in which at the moment of death the evidences of intangibles
passing under the will of a decedent domiciled in one state
were physically present in another. The conclusion followed
that the transfer was taxable under the Tennessee statute.
The Elliott case determined that New York might constitutionally tax a domiciliary's relinquishment at death of a
power to revoke a trust of intangibles held by a Colorado
trustee. Following the McCanless decision it was held that the
right to revoke the trust had the attributes of property and
was a potential source of wealth; that the legal interest in the
intangibles held in trust in Colorado was not so dissociated
from the person of the decedent as to be beyond the taxing
power of the state of domicile any more than the decedent's
other rights in intangibles. The court said that, as in the case
of any other intangibles, control over the person and estate of
the decedent at the place of domicile and the duty of decedent
to contribute to the support of government there, afforded
adequate constitutional bases for the imposition of a tax measured by the value of the intangibles transmitted or relinquished at death. The fact that the power was donated by
another was held to be without significance. Reliance was in
part on Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 [36 S.Ct. 473, 60
L.Ed. 830], invoked as support for the dissenting view in the
Wachovia case. (See also Orr v. Gilman (1901), 183 U.S.
278 [22 S.Ct. 213, 46 L.Ed. 196J ; Blackstone v. Miller, 188
U.S. 189 [23 S.Ct. 277,47 L.Ed 439] ; Chanler v. Kelsey, 205
U.S. 466 [27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 882]. Cf. Brooke v. City of
Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 [48 A.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 767] ; Safe Deposit If T. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 [50 S.Ct. 59, 74 L.Ed.
180].)
The foregoing declarations disclosed the fundamental error
in arriving at a contrary conclusion in the Wachovia and
Bowditch cases by the failure to ascribe the recognized proprietary attributef': to similar acts. Consequently in Graves v.
Schmidlapp (1942).315 U.S. 657 [62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097,
141 A.L.R. 948] the Snprl'me Court overruled the Wachovia
case in applying the Bullen. McCanless and Elliott flecisions
to sustain the constitutional power of New York to tax the
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transfer effected by a resident decedent's exercise of a power
of appointment created by the will of a nonresident donor in
respect to intangibles held in trust in Massachusetts. In reversing the New York Court of Appeals' affirmance of the
Surrogate's decree which reduced the assessed estate tax on
the authority of the Wachovia case, the Supreme Court said:
"The conclusion there reached and the reasons advanced in
its support cannot be reconciled with the decision and the
reasoning of the Bullen, the McCanless and the Elliott cases.
It is plain that if appropriate emphasis be placed on the
orderly administration of justice rather than blind adherence
to conflicting precedents, the W achovia ca~e must be overruled. There is no reason why the state should continue to be
deprived of revenue from a subject which from the beginning
has been within the reach of its taxing power; a subject over
which we cannot say the state's control has been curtailed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No
interest which could be served by so rigid an adherence to
stare decisis is superior to the demands of a system of justice
based on a considered and a consistent application of the
Constitution. "
Points of similarity or difference in the various cases are
immaterial because they also are of no significance here. There
can now be no question of the power of California to impose
the tax in question; and conflicting declarations which led to
a contrary result in the Bowditch case are overruled. The
statute clearly provides that the exercise of the power of
appointment is deemed .. a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act, in the same manner as though the property
to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the
donee of such power, and had been bequeathed or derived by
such donee by I will." (Inheritance Tax Act of 1921, as
amended in 1929, § 2(6), Stats. 1929, p. 1834.) The statutory
provision as incorporated in the 1935 act is applicable here
and supports the imposition of the tax reported by the in·
heritance tax appraiser.
The order is reversed.

)

Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-J concur, but deem it advisable to spell ont
with particularity the reasons for my concurrence.
The Inheritance Tax Acts of this state plainly provide for

)

I
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the imposition of the tax in the present case. Section 2 of
the Inheritance Tax Act of 1935 as amended in 1941, by whieh
this appeal is governed, provides:
"A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon, the transfer
of any property, real or personal, or of any interest therein
or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise . . . said taxes
to be upon the market value of such property at the date of
death of the decedent and at the rates hereinafter prescribed . . .
"(6) Powers of appointment. Whenever any person or corporation shall be given a general or limited power of appointment by virtue of any disposition of property made before
or after 5 p.m. of June 25, 1935, such gift of power of appointment shall, under the provisions of this act ... be
deemed a taxable transfer made from the donor of said power
to the donee thereof at the date of the donor's death, except
that:
"(a) Where the donor of a power of appointment died
prior to 5 p.m. of June 25, 1935, and the power is exercised
thereafter, the exercise of said power of appointment shall
be deemed a transfer taxable as provided in Subdivision (6)
of Section 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act of 1921, as amended
in 1929." (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8495, § 2, pp. 32073208.)
Subdivision (6) of section 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act
of 1921 as amended in 1929 provides:
"Whenever any person, trustee or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition
of property made either before or after the passage of this
____ .__... ___ ac~,8Uchappoint~e..nt, when made, shall be deemed a transfer
.
taxable under the pf(ovisions of this act, ,n the same manner
as though the property to which such appointment relates
belonged absolutely to the donee of such power, and had been
bequeathed or derived by such donee by will." (Stats. 1929,
ch. 844, pp. 1836-1837. Italics added.)
Subdivision (~) of section 1 of the 1935 act provides that
"'property' as used in this act . . . shall include all intangible personal property of resident decedents within or
without the State or subject to the jurisdiction thereof." (3
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8495, § 1 (2), p. 3206.)
Decedent's father, the donor of the power, died in 1921.
Decedent died domiciled in California on March 11, 1943,
leaving a will executed in New York in 1930 appointing his

838
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wife, respondent bcrein, beneficiary under his power of appointment of the trust assetll. His will was probated in California. Since the donor of the power died before June 25,
1935, and the power was exercised after that date, the 192]
and 1935 acts clearly impose a tax on the transfer of the
trust assets from decedent to his wife by virtue of decedent'8
exercise of the power of appointment since the appointment is
"deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act,
in the same manner as though the property to which such
appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such
power. and had been bequeathed or derived by such donee by
will. "
Respondent contends, however, that, notwithstanding the
express statutory provisions for the taxation of the transfer,
the transfer is not taxable under the decision of this court
in Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal. 377 [208 P. 282. 23 A.L.R. 735].
In her view, the Bowditch case, unlike Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 575 [47 S.Ct. 202, 71
L.Ed. 413], did not decide that there is a constitutional impedi.
ment to the imposition of the tax. She views Estate of Bowditch as a decision that the California Inheritance Tax Acts
do not apply to transfers of property by one who, under
California property law, is not the owner of the property
transferred. Sh~ asserts that since the Bowditch case decided
only that the statute did not impose such a tax, it is una1Iected by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 [62 8. Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed.
1097, 141 A.L.R. 948], that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not prohibit its imposition.
Respondent's contention finds no support in the language of
the statute or in the decisionofthis-eourt in-Estate of Bowditch. The iimposition of an inheritance or estate tax does
not depend on the decedent's ownership of the property under
common law principles. The tax is not imposed on the prop·
erty. but on the decedent's transfer of that property.
When, as in the present case, the statute expressly makes the
transfer of property taxable "in the same manner as though
the property ... belonged absolutely" to the decedent, it is
irrelevant that under common law concepts of property ownership the property did not belong absolutely to the decedent.
The only question then is whether the imposition of such a
tax is within the constitutional power of the state.
Since 1901 it has been recognized that the stat(' may properly
tax the transfer of property by the donee of the power to
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his appointee under its plenary power to control succession
to the estates of its domiciliaries. "Whatever may be the.
technical source of title of a grantee under a power of appointment it cannot be denied that, in reality and substance,
it is the execution of the power that gives the grantee the
property passing under it . . . When David Dows, Senior,
devised this property to the appointee under the will of his
son he necessarily subjected it to the charge that the State
might impose on the privilege accorded to the son of making
a will. That charge is the same in character as if it had been
laid on the inheritance of the estate of the son himself, that
is, for the privilege of succeeding to property under a will."
(Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278,282-283 [22 S.Ct. 213, 46 L.Ed.
196] ; Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 474-475, 477 [27 S.Ct.
550,51 L.Ed. 882].)
"Decedent's . . . power to dispose of the intangihles at
death was property in his hands in New York, where he was
domiciled. Graves v. Elliott, supra. He there made effective
use of the power to bestow his bounty on the widow. Its exercise by will to make a gift was as much an enjoyment of a
property right as would have heen a like bequest to his
widow from his own securities. See Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112, 117 [61 S.Ct. 144, 85 L.Ed. 75, 131 A.L.R. 655].
. . . Taxation of such enjoyment of the power to dispose of
property is as much within the constitutional power of the
state of his domicile as is the taxation of the transfer at
death of intangibles which he owns.
C C Since it is the exercise of the power to dispose of the
intangibles which is the taxable event, the mere fact that the
power was acquired as a donation from another is without
significance. We can perceive no ground for saying that its
exercise by the p.onee is for that reason any the less the enjoyment of a property right, or any the less subject to taxation
at his domicile. The source of the power by gift no more
takes its exercise by the donee out of. the taxing power than
the like disposition of a chose in action or a share of stock,
ownership of which is acquired by gift." (Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, 662-663 [62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141
A.L.R. 948].)
Grave! v. Schmidlapp did not alter any concepts of property
ownership. The taxability of transfers of property by a
donee's exercise of a power of appointment was established
by the Orr and Cbanler cases under statutes identical with

)
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section 2 (6) of the 1921 act under which Estate of Bowditch
was decided. (See also, Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625
[36 S.Ct. 473, 60 L.Ed. 830].) Nor did United States v.
Field, 255 U.S. 257 (41 8.Ct. 256, 65 L.Ed. 617], announce a
different rule. In that case, the court was not concerned
with a statute expressly taxing the transfer of property by the
donee's exercise of a power of appointment such as those
before it in the Orr and Chanler cases or that before the
California Supreme Court in Estate of Bowditch. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought to include in the decedent's gross estate the value of property subject to the
decedent's power of appointment derived from her husband'8
will, on the theory that the donee of a power of appointment
was the owner of property subject thereto within the meaning
of section 202 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1916.- He relied,
not on a statutory provision taxing the transfer of property
by the exercise of a power of appointment, but on the general provision including in a decedent's gross estate all property owned by the decedent at the time of his death. The court
held that there was no question "as to the power of Congress
to impose a tax upon the passing of property under testamentary execution of a power of appointment," regarding
that question as settled by Ghanler v. Kelsey. It held that
the only question was whether Congress had done so. The
exercise of the power, in the absence of specific statutory
provision therefor, did not of itself require the inclusion of
the appointed property in the gross estate of the donee, and
the court held that since Congress had not expressly authorized
the inclusion of the appointed property in the decedent's
gross estate the tax eouId not be sustained. (United States v.
Field, 255 U.S. 257, 263 (41 8.Ct. 256,65 L.Ed. 617J.) Since
the decision in the Field case, and without any change in
concepts of property ownership, Congress bas enacted legislation including in the donee's gross estate property subject to
his power of appointment as if he were the absolute owner
thereof. (Internal Revenue Code § 811 (f].) There has been
no change in the concept of property ownership enunciated
by the Field case; that decision is still applicable to powers
of appointment exercised before the enactment of section
811 (f). Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Go., 316 U.S.
56, 63 [62 8.Ct. 925, 86 L.Ed. 1266, 139 A.L.R. 1518].)
-Now section 811 (a) of tlle Internal Revenue Code, requiring the in·
clusion in the decedent's gross estate of all property "to the extent of
the iJaterest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
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Congress did, however, under the same concepts of property
ownership underlying the Field decision, enact a statute by
which property transferred by the exercise or nonexercise of a
power of appointment is deemed transferred by the donee of
the power and included in his gross estate. (HeZvering v.
Safe Deposit & Trust 00., 316 U.S. 56, 65 [62 8.Ct. 925, 86
L.Ed. 1266, 139 A.L.R. 1513].)
The basis of the decision in the Bowditch case is not that
the transfer of property by appointment may not be taxed
as a transfer by will from the donee, but that California did
not have the constitutional power to tax the transfer if the
evidences of ownership of the intangible personal property
transferred were located outside the state. The court expressly held that the plenary power of the state to tax succession to property could not be asserted in that case for the
reason that "both the physical and constructive situs of the
[appointed] property" was outside the state. Since the legal
title was held by nonresident trustees and the evidences of
ownership of the intangibles transferred in that case were
located outside the state, the court held that California did
not have jurisdiction to tax the transfer of that property by
the will of a resident decedent. The tax could be sustained
"only in the event that the personal property which is the
subject of the said power is within the jurisdiction of the
state." (Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal. 377, 380 [208 P. 282,
23 A.L.R. 735].) The court's determination of California's
"jurisdiction to impose an inheritance tax" was cited with
approval in the 1926 decision of the United States Supreme
Court holding that the imposition of a similar tax under an
identical statute was Ibeyond the constitutional power of the
State of North Carolina. (Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 575 [47 8.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413].)
The error of the decisions in the Bowditch and Wachovia
Bank & Trust cases arose out of the reasoning that intangible
personal property must have a situs or physical location.
Althougb the situs of realty or tangible personal property
controls the jurisdiction of a state to tax the transfer thereof
(Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 489 [45 8.Ct. 603, 69
L.Ed. 1058]; Treichler v. State of Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251
[70 8.Ct. 1, 3-4, 94 L.Ed. --]), "very different considerations, both theoretical and practical, apply to the taxation of
intangibles, that is, rights which are not related to physical
things. Such rights are but relationships between persons,
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natural or corporate, which the law recognizes by attaching
to them certain sanctions enforceable in courts. The power
of government over them and the protection which it gives
them cannot be exerted through control of a physical thing.
They can be made effective only through control over and
protection afforded to those persons whose relationships are the
origin of the rights. See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm,
174 U.S. 710, 716 [19 S.Ct. 797,43 L.Ed.1144] ; Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215, 222 [25 8.Ot. 625, 49 L.Ed. 1023]. Qbviously,
88 sources of actual and potential wealth-which is an appropriate measure of any tax imposed on ownership or its
exercise-they cannot be dissociated from the persons from
whose relationships they are derived. They are not in any
sense fictions. They are indisputable realities.
"The power to tax 'is an incident of sovereignty, and is
co-extensive with that to which it is an incident. All subjects
over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are objects
of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon
the soundest principles, exempt from taxation.' McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 429 [4 L.Ed. 579]. But
this does not mean that the sovereign power of the state does
not extend over intangibles of a domiciled resident because
they have no physical location within its territory, or that its
power to tax is lost because we may choose to say they are
located elsewhere. A jurisdiction which dOes not depend on
physical presence within the state is not lost by declaring
that it is absent. From the beginning of our constitutional
system control over the person at the place of his domicile
and his duty there, common to all citizens, to contribute to
the support of government have been deemed to afi'ord an
adequate constitutional basis for imposing on him a tax on
the use and enjoyment of rights in intangibles measured by
their value. bntil this moment that jurisdiction has not been
thought to depend on any factor other than the domicile of
the owner within the taxing state, or to compel the attribution
to intangibles of a physical presence within its territory, 88
though they were chattels, in order to support the tax."
(Ourry v. McOanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-367 [59 S.Ot. 900,
83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162]; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S.
383,386 [59 S.Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed. 1356].)
It follows, therefore, that since California did have the
power to tax the transfer of the appointed property by the
donee and plainly provided for such a tax, and since its·
jurisdiction to impose the tax did not depend upon "the:
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attribution to intangibles of a physical presence within its
territory," the fact that the legal title to the intangibles was
beld by nonresident trustees and the evidences of ownership
of the securities subject to Charlotte Bowditch's power of
appointment were physically located outside the state should
not have deprived California of jurisdiction to tax their trans·
fer. in the light of its decision in Ourry v. McOanless, the
United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315
U.S. 657, 662·663, 665 [62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 A.L.R.
948], overruled its earlier decision in the Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. case and held that the state's jurisdiction to tax
the transfer of the appointed property was not lost because
the "intangibles . . . have no physical location within its
territory," so long as t.he donee of the power was domiciled in
the taxing state. The court beld that there was no question
that the statute there under consideration, essentially identical
with section 2(6) of the 1921 act, taxed the transfer as one
from the donee of the power of appointment,- or that New
York had the constitutional power to enact such a statute.
(Ohanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 477 [27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed.
882].) Since the transfer by the donee of the power was the
taxable event, the residence of the donor was immaterial.
"The mere fact that the power was acquired as a donation
from another is without significance." (315 U.S. at 663.)
Since the jurisdiction to tax intangibles is not dependent on
physical presence within the state (Ourry v. McOanless,
supra), it was held that neither the residence of the trustees
nor the location of the evidences of ownerlShip of the appo.inted
intangibles affected the jurisdiction of the taxing state. (315
U.S. at 664·665.) For thesE' reasons, the New York statute,
admittedly valid as to property located within the state, was
held valid as to resident donees irrespective of the "physical
and constructive situs" of the property. With the decision
of tbe United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp,
the decision of this court in Estate of Bowditch that California
did not have the constitutional power to tax the transfer
therein has been as conclusively repudiated as the similar
decision of the New York Court of Appeals (State Tax Oom.
V. Schmidlapp, 286 N.Y. 596 [35 N.E.2d 937), which was

)

·"We are here concernE'd with a tax on the transfer of property from
a decedent who by virtue of her power of appointment is. by the express
language of the statutE' [the same liS section 2(6)]. deemed the absolute
owner of the property to which ber power of appointment relates."
(E8tate of Bohnert, 244 Wis. 404, 409 [12 N.W.2d 684].)
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reversed in Graves v. Schmidlapp. The question therefore is
not, as respondent asserts, whether Estate of Bowditch as a
decision on statutory construction should be overruled, but
whether Estate of Bowditch as a decision on California's constitutional power to tax contrary to the latest decision of the
United States Supreme Court must be overruled. As a decision predicated on the due process clause of the United States
Constitution, Estate of Bowditch cannot survive Curry v.
McCanless and Graves v. Schmidlapp.
Respondent, however, contends that "even if Estate of
Bowditch has been overruled by a 1942 decision [Graves v.
8chmidlapp] as to any constitutional question involved, the
1935 act and the 1941 amendments were made in view of
and adopted the rule of that case." It is her view that the
reenactment of section 2(6) of the 1921 act after Estate of '
Bowditch without change therein was ,. obviously motivated
by a desire to conform the statute to the Court's decision,"
for, had the Legislature disapproved the decision therein, it
would have expressly repudiated it. It is in effect contended
that the perpetuation of an erroneous interpretation of the
United States Constitution may be achieved by legislative
failure to defy the decisions of this court and of the Supreme
Court of the United States announcing that interpretation.
Section 2 (6) of the 1921 act insofar as it governs the present
case was not amended in 1935; it was incorporated into the
1935 act just as it read at the time the Bowditch case was decided. The shifting of the tax from the exercise of the power
by the donee to the creation of the power by the donor was
expressly made applicable only to powers created by donors
dying after June 25, 1935, the effective date of the amendment;
as to powers I created by donors dying before that date but
exercised thereafter, the exercise of the power remained "a
transfer taxable under the provisions of this act, in the same
manner as though the property to which such appointment
relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power." The
express language of the statute negatives any inference that
the Legislature repealed the provision taxing the transfer by
the exercise of the power because of the construction and application it was given by Estate of Bowditch. How, in the face
of the fact that the Legislature incorporated the earlier statute
verbatim into the 1935 act, can it be said that it repealed the
provision' The Legislature could not more clearly demonstrate an intention to stand by the method of taxing such
transfers so far as it constitutionally could do so. That in-
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tention is also demonstrated by the 1923 amendment of section
2 (1) of the 1921 act (Stats. 1923, ch. 337, p. 694), providing
for the taxation of all transfers at death of intangible personal
property of resident decedent!> "within or without the State
or subject to the jurisdiction thereof. " (Italicized words
added by the 1923 amendment.) By that amendment the
Legislature clearly expressed an intention to tax all transfers
at death to the full extent of California's jurisdiction to tax.
No other construction of legislative intention can be maintained consistently with this amendment.
Whatever merit there may be in the theory that the reenactment of a statute without change adopts the judicial
construction thereof (cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61, 69 [66 8. Ct. 826, 90 L.Ed. 1084]; Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14, 22-23 [67 8. Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12] ; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 [60 8.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604,
125 A.L.R. 1368] ), it is limited to cases in which the preceding
decision has purported to interpret the statute. It has no
application when the decision was that enforcement of the
statute was beyond the state's constitutional power. Estate of
Bowditch did not interpret section 2 (6) of the 1921 act; it
decided that, as properly interpreted, the statute prescribed
a tax that was beyond California's jurisdiction to impose. The
decision therein was so interpreted by a later decision of this
court (Estate of Dillingham, 196 Cal. 525, 534 [238 P. 367]),
and was cited by the United States Supreme Court as authority
for its decision that a similar application of an identical statute
by North Carolina was beyond its constitutional power. (WachoviaBank & Trust1 00. v.Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 575 [47
S.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413] ; see also, Wachovia Bank & Prust
Co.v. Doughton, 189 N.C. 50, 55 [126 S.E. 176] ; Trowbridge,
Recent Inheritance Tax and Estate Tax Decisions, 14 Cal.L.
Rev. 1, 8; Nossaman, State Taxation of Intangibles, 18 Cal.
L.Rev. 345, 369.) It would be an anomalous doctrine that
legislative reenactment of a statute held partially unconstitutional adopts the decision on the issue of constitutionalIty as
part of the statute. This court is not estopped to correct its
own error merely because the Legislature has not chosen to
defy the court's interpretation of the United States Constitution.
For the same reasons, it cannot be inferred from the Controller's failure to reassert the provisions of section 2 (6) in
cases such as Estate of B01l'd1'tch that his inaction constitutes
an administrative interpretation of the statute the same u that

!
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now urged by respondent. The Controller's failure after
Estate of Bowditch to attempt to tax such transfers did not
demonstrate an interpretation of the statute, but only the
recognition that under Bowditch and Wachovia the application of the statute according to the plain meaning of its provisions would be unconstitutional. The Controller can no
more be required to defy the decisions of this court and the
United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of a
statute than can the state Legislature. The Controller did
not unduly delay in asserting the jurisdiction that the United
States Supreme Court in 1942 asserted that he has; this proceeding was begun in 1943. It cannot reasonably be said that
this is a case in which administrative or legislative inaction
demonstrates an intention to accept an interpretation of the
statute at variance with its plain meaning and the interpretation given identical statutes by the United States Supreme
Court and the courts of other states. {Graves v. Schmidlapp,
315 U.S. 657,662-663 [62 S.Ot. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 A.L.R.
948] ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 189 N.C. 50,
53 [126 S.E. 176) ; Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465, 469 [50
N.E.2d 69) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 815 Mass. 457,
472 [53 N.E.2d 113] ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Kelly, 134 N.J.Eq.
120,133 [34 A.2d 538] ; Estate of Rohnert, 244 Wis. 404, 409
[12 N.W.2d 684].)
Amici curiae on behalf of respondent contend that if section
2 (6) of the 1935 act is construed to apply to the transfer in
the present case, the statute violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it arbitrarily
discriminates between resident donees exercising powers of
appointment created by donors dying before June 25,-1935,
and resident donees exercising powers created by donors dyinR
after that date. It is contended that, since the taxability of
the exercise of the power by the donee depends upon the date
of death of the donor, the statute is invalid for the reasons
stated in Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 [57 8. Ct. 206, 81
L.Ed.239].
Binney v. Long involved a 1909 Massachusetts statute under
which the transfer of property by the exercise or non-exercise
of a power of appointment created by a donor dying before
1907 was taxed, but no tax was imposed if the power was
created after 1907. A divided court, Justices Cardozo and
Brandeis dissenting, held that the statute was invalid in that it
arbitrarily selected a past date and discriminated between
powera of appointment created before that date and tho8e
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ereated thereafter. It is clear that the invalidity of the statute
was not predicated upon the selection of a date upon which the
taxability or nontaxability of the transfer depended, but upon
the fact that the selection of the date bore no reasonable relation to any legitimate legislative purpose. "Upon its face the
atatute arbitrarily selects a past date, taxing the beneficiaries
of an act if done prior to, and leaving untaxed beneficiaries of
a precisely similar act if done subsequent to that date;"
(Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280, 289 [57 S.Ot. 206, 81
L.Ed. 239].)
Binney v. Long has since been limited to the particular
situation with which it was concerned and held not to apply
to a statute in which the date upon which taxability· is made
to depend is not arbitrarily selected but is designed to e1fectuate a legitimate legislative purpose. (Whitney v. State Taz
Comm., 309 U.S. 530, 541 [60 s.Ct. 635,84 L.Ed. 909].) In
the Whitney case the court held constitutional a New York
statute similar to that in the present case in which the taxation
of transfers of property subject to a power of appointment w~
shifted from the exercise of the power to the gift thereof, and
in which an unintended tax immunity was averted by the provision that powers created before the effective date of the
change but exercised thereafter would be taxed under the
statute in effect at the time of their creation. In 1930 the New
York Legislature shifted the tax on transfers of property subject to a power of appointment from the exercise by the donee
to the creation by the donor. Powers created before 1930 but
exercised after that date were immune from taxation, since
they were created at the time the tax was imposed upon their
exercise and they were exercised at the time the tax was imposed on their creation. By amendment to the inheritance tax
act in 1932, New York .pecifically provided that as to such
powers the method of taxation prevailing before 1930 should
govern, just as the California Legislature has done in the
1935 and 1941 amendments of section 2 (6). The court upheld
the statute against the contention that it was invalid under
the doctrine of Binney v. Long, supra, in that it discriminated
between donees whose powers were created before 1930 and
who were taxed on the exercise thereof, i.nd those whose
powers were created after 1930 and were exempt from taxation on their exercise. The Binney case was distinguished on
the ground that the date upon which taxation depended was
arbitrarily selected whereas in the Whitney case it was the
date upon which the change in method of tuatioD became
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effective, and the classification of powers into those created before 1930 and those created thereafter was reasonably related
to the legislative purpose of preventing an unintended tax
immunity. It was this statute. that, as applied to resident
donees of powers created by nonresident donors, was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court in Graves v. Schmidlapp,
315 U.S. 657 [62 S.Ot. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097, 141 A.L.R. 948].
The Whitney ease cannot be distinguished on the ground
that the power there considered was created by a resident
donor. There, as in the present case, the statute unequivocally
imposed the tax on the exercise of the power by the resident
donee whether the donor was a resident of the state or not.
The statute was upheld on the ground that it was merely a
continuation of the method of taxation in force at the time
of their creation for powers created before 1930 but exercised
thereafter. Such a tax may be properly imposed even though
the donor of the power was a nonresident and the transfer
would not have been taxable had the power been created after
1930. (Graves v. Schmidlap, supra, 315 U.S. 657.) Since
the residence of the donor does not control the imposition of
a tax upon the transfer by the donee, it cannot be material
to a claim that equal protection of the laws has been denied.
This appeal is therefore governed by Whitney v. State Tax
Oommission and not by Binney v. Long. Before June 25,
1935, the exercise of the power of appointment was made the
taxable event; after that date, the tax is imposed npon the
creation of the power. In cases such as the present, however,
where the donor died before the effective date of the change and
the donee exercised the power after that date, neither tax would
apply and the same unintended tax immunity would be
created as in the New York statute before its amendment. The
California Legislature took the same course as the New York
Legislature and provided that as to such powers the t.ax
would be imposed under the statute previously in effect.
(Section 2 (6) of the 1921 act, as amended in 1929.) In this
manner, the Legislature created the same two classes of resident donees as those approved in the Whitney case. Given
the legislative purpose to be achieved by the classification,
the equal protection clause only requires that the classification be reasonably related to the achievement of that purpose
and that all persons within each class be treated alike. (Estate
of Elston, 32 Oal.App.2d 652, 658-659 [90 P.2d 608].)
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October
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